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Abstract 
Our day to day study of the Romanian stock market during the period 
July 2007 – September 2009 revealed in many cases a specific behavior. 
Although all the emerging markets from the region evolved in correlation 
with the more established exchanges, the negative impact of the crisis on our 
exchange was in many aspects deeper and more powerful than it should have 
been if we look at the actual macro and micro economic situation, 
considering the empirical evidence that the capital market is positively 
correlated with the long term economic growth. We think that this 
overreaction to the negative side is the direct result of the lack of maturity of 
our local exchange (in terms of capitalization, liquidity, participants, 
legislation and surveillance) and we propose a few measures that are 
supposed to render a sustainable development and may improve its stability 
during times of financial turbulences. 
Key-words: contagion, correlation, financial crisis, emerging capital 
markets 
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1. Two very important characteristics of Bucharest Stock Exchange’s 
evolution during the first 24 months of the financial crisis 
 
Given our privileged position inside the Romanian capital market, we were 
able to monitor the behavior of the stock exchange, day by day, in real time, since 
the early beginning of the current crisis. Actually, it is our strong belief that in 
Romania, the Bucharest Stock Exchange (BSE) was in fact the first institution, and 
the Romanian brokers were the first community that felt the effects and 
consequences of the subprime collapse in United States of America. This happened 
because the local stock market was already in the process of getting correlated with 
the major stock markets around the world. At the moment when the stocks’ decline 
started in USA and Western Europe, the main indexes of Bucharest Stock 
Exchange started their long and abrupt downtrend. 
This is in our opinion the first important characteristic of the way our local 
exchange behaved during the crisis: it was highly correlated with the global 
markets. 
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In the paper Contagion across Central and Eastern European Stock Markets: 
A Dynamic Conditional Correlation Test the authors argue that the conditional 
correlations become more statistically significant with the global market  as we go 
from the early stages (2005) to spring of 2009. 
We can offer a visual demonstration of the correlation between BSE’s main 
index BET and the New York Stock Exchange’s SP500 in the chart presented in 
fig. 1. 
 
 
 
Source: BSE, NYSE data and authors’ calculations 
Fig. 1. Correlation between BET and S&P500 
 
Between July 2007 and August 2009 we had periods with higher and lower 
intensity of the correlation, but the major peaks and troughs were almost at the 
same time. Also the overall direction was almost always the same for the two 
indices. 
The second important characteristic of our stock exchange during the crisis 
was that for a long period of time it was decoupled from the local economy. 
Bucharest Stock Exchange reached its peak at the end of July 2007. Still, for the 
local economy, 2007 was a great year. Also, for the most part of 2008, Romania 
registered a very good economic growth both in terms of GDP and in terms of 
companies’ profits. In the late autumn of 2008, the economic problems started to 
show signs (or in some cases become evident) for the first time in Romania. By 
that time the BSE’s main indexes had already lost more than 70% as we show 
below in fig. 2. 
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Source: BSE data and authors’ calculations 
Fig. 2. BET evolution between June 2007 and August 2009 
 
 
Data from Eurostat are showing that Romania’s GDP continued to expand 
until the third quarter of 2008 and only after that the economic activity began its 
decline. Thereafter, we can say that the stock market anticipated the downturn in 
the real economy with four quarters in advance. The early decline of the BET and 
other local stock indices are the result of the sell orders issued by the foreign 
institutional investors who made their exits from the emerging economies as they 
anticipated that the crisis will also spread towards them. They acted before the 
actual economic data could confirm their supposition, which is absolutely normal 
behavior in the stock market. The only surprising element is that this time, in 
Romania’s case, the period of time between the anticipation and the confirmation 
was extremely long. 
Below we present quarterly GDP data for Romania and the performance of 
the BSE during the same period. 
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       Table 1 
Romanian GDP and BET performance (quarterly data, 2006q1-2009q2) 
  
GDP (mio EUR) 
%QoQ GDP 
growth 
BET value 
(points) 
%QoQ 
growth 
2006q01 22276.7  7499  
2006q02 23616.1 6.01% 7056 -5.91% 
2006q03 24391.1 3.28% 7952 12.71% 
2006q04 26413.7 8.29% 8050 1.22% 
2007q01 27861.1 5.48% 8547 6.18% 
2007q02 30255.1 8.59% 9665 13.08% 
2007q03 32152.6 6.27% 9635 -0.31% 
2007q04 31868.3 -0.88% 9825 1.97% 
2008q01 32161.9 0.92% 6920 -29.57% 
2008q02 33692.3 4.76% 6502 -6.03% 
2008q03 35607.9 5.69% 4258 -34.52% 
2008q04 33797.1 -5.09% 2901 -31.87% 
2009q01 30159.8 -10.76% 2367 -18.39% 
2009q02 28699.9 -4.84% 3434 45.07% 
Source: GDP data from Eurostat, BET values from BSE and authors’ calculations 
 
2. Particularities of the correlation between BSE and the global markets 
 
While being correlated with the global markets is something normal for an 
emerging stock exchange, the exact way that our local market behaved during the first 
part of the crisis presented some particularities that worth being mentioned and studied. 
First of all, we witnessed higher average intraday volatility at BSE’s indexes 
compared with S&P500, DJI, DAX or FTSE100. During the 2 years of turbulence in 
the markets there were quite many days when local indexes fluctuated more than 5% 
(either positive or negative) while mature markets rarely exceeded 3%. Also, BSE had 
a few panic days (not consecutive though) when blue chips raised or declined 15% 
(maximum permitted by the electronic trading system) and there were no more 
buyers/sellers willing to put orders into the market. 
Also, during the 2007-2008, most of the time, the negative days for S&P500 
were followed by extreme declines on BSE, while positive days for S&P500 were 
followed by only minor recoveries. We could say that BSE copied and exaggeratedly 
amplified all the negative events from the international markets, but had only small 
reactions to the positive events. This behavior is partially explained by the contagion 
effect. 
Very often, BSE opened the day with large gaps that reflect the overnight 
exchange activity in USA and Asia. Usually these gaps range between 1% to 3%, 
positive or negative, comparing with the closing price of the preceding trading day. 
And last but not least, during the whole period, BSE had very limited or almost 
no reaction at all when local macro indicators were announced, but fluctuated wildly 
at 8:30 EST when important US macroeconomic indicators were made public. 
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3. Characteristics of BSE that made it more vulnerable to the global downtrend 
The emerging economies are more volatile on short and medium term and less 
resilient to macroeconomic turbulences than larger and developed economies. As a 
result, the corresponding emerging stock markets will be less credible for global 
institutional investors. The speculative capital is tempted to rush out of these markets 
when a global crisis is anticipated and this will put a powerful downward pressure on 
the local stock markets. Romania is such a vulnerable emerging economy and because 
of that, BSE felt the negative impact of the foreign speculative capital outflows since 
the early beginning of the crisis. Bellow we present the monthly flow of foreign capital 
at BSE during the period January 2007 – July 2009. 
During the first year of the stock market decline foreigners were very active on 
the Romanian stock exchange, mostly selling stocks and repatriating capital. They 
contributed a lot to the daily market turnover and influenced the prices with their sell 
orders. 
     Table 2 
Foreign speculative capital inflows/outflows  
(January 2007 – July 2009) 
 
Source: Data from Romanian National Securities Commission and authors’ calculations 
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In time, most of the active foreign players (foreign financial investors) 
liquidated their positions and became inactive. They no longer had stocks or 
liquidities in Romania so they no longer participated to the daily transactions. 
The strategic investors (fewer in number than financial investors) mostly kept 
their positions but did not buy any more. They were quite inactive during most of 
the crisis period (until now) and, as a result, they had very little contribution to the 
daily transactions during all periods. 
As a consequence, during the second part of the crisis, the foreigners’ activity 
on BSE declined dramatically. Not being sustained by large players from outside 
the country, the liquidity dried up on BSE and the market began to be more and 
more influenced by local players. 
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Source: Data from Romanian National Securities Commission and authors’ calculations 
 
Fig. 3. Foreign speculative capital net flows (January 2007 – July 2009) 
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Among local players, the portfolio investors were also inactive during the 
second part of the crisis, mostly because they had sustained heavy losses or 
because they had already sold everything and preferred to wait on the sidelines. So, 
during the second part of the crisis period only local speculators remained active. 
The market became highly speculative and unpredictable. The main habit of the 
local speculators was to trade in the direction of the global markets. As a result, the 
correlation between BSE and foreign indices remained very high. 
This normal vulnerably was accentuated by the lack of maturity of our stock 
market, specifically by its reduced total market capitalization, also by its low 
capitalization of the free float, by the small number of the companies listed on the 
stock exchange, the low daily turnover and scarcity of the financial instruments 
available for hedging/risk management. 
Also, the reduced influence from local investors (because of their lower 
financial strength) compared with the pressure exercised by foreign institutional 
investors was a feature that accentuated the vulnerability of BSE during the crisis. 
The local investors that participate in trading at BSE can be described using 
two main categories: institutional investors and private investors. 
The local institutional investors are: 
a) general insurance companies that have weak participation in the stock 
market because they prefer to invest mostly in bonds; 
b) life insurance companies (selling unit linked products) that actually have 
some participation in the local stock market, but very limited; 
c) opened-end investment funds, which are the oldest institutional investors 
on BSE. They invest an important part of their net asset value into Romanian 
stocks but unfortunately (because of their troubled history) don’t succeed to attract 
significant amounts of capital to manage and invest; 
d) level III (facultative) and Level II (mandatory) privately managed pension 
funds: still very young and until now seriously undercapitalized. 
Private investors are very small in number compared with the total active 
population and on average have little capital available for investing in stocks (most 
of them prefer fixed income). 
 
4. Proposed measures to render a sustainable development for BSE and 
to improve its stability during times of financial turbulences 
In our opinion, the vulnerabilities described above are the result of the lack of 
maturity of BSE. In order to improve its stability during times of financial 
turbulence, we need to further develop the exchange and stimulate the development 
of the local investors in order to increase their participation in the market. 
Among the things that can be done by the exchange officials and stock 
market professionals, we consider that the most important is to encourage new 
large private owned companies to float on the market. By bringing more issuers to 
the exchange, the market depth will increase (in terms of total capitalization, free 
float, daily market turnover and total number of daily stock transactions). 
 80 
One particular way of development may be to promote companies that are 
currently traded/listed on the Rasdaq OTC market to the second tear of BSE. These 
are small but dynamic companies, mostly private owned, with a very diversified 
field of activities and with potential for the current investors. 
Of course, the fastest way to improve the market depth would be to float on 
the stock exchange the companies where the state is currently the major 
shareholder. This could be done as part of faster and more transparent privatization 
process. Also, if the Ownership Fund will eventually be floated on the exchange, 
this will represent a powerful boost for BSE. While many promises were made 
during the last years from the government officials, these large state owned 
companies will probably not be floated in the near future. This is why although 
they will represent the most important breakthrough in the sustainable development 
of the BSE, the exchange officials and the local brokerage community must only 
rely on their own efforts directed towards convincing private owned companies of 
the advantages of being traded on our local stock market. 
Regarding the local investors, the participation of both private persons and 
institutional investors is deficient and has a lot of room for improvement. If the 
local capital will grow and will begin to represent a larger share of the average 
daily market turnover, the BSE’s vulnerability at the movements of foreign 
speculative capital will be significantly reduced (as the Poland’s experience clearly 
shows). The easier way would be to attract more private persons to invest on the 
local exchange, but the most efficient way remains to convince the institutional 
investors (mainly the Level II and Level III private managed pension funds) of the 
long term profitability of investing in companies traded on BSE. 
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